

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**  
COMPARTMENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE




MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Gambino  
Chairman, DCI Security Committee


9 MAR 1970

SUBJECT: Annual Report of the Compartmentation Subcommittee

The annual report of the Compartmentation Subcommittee is  
forwarded as requested.



Chairman, Compartmentation  
Subcommittee  
DCI Security Committee

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Annual Report of the DCI  
Security Committee Compart-  
mentation Subcommittee 

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## ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

### SECURITY COMMITTEE

#### COMPARTMENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE

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1. ☐ Authority and Mission. The Compartmentation Subcommittee of the DCI Security Committee (SECOM) was established under authority of Attachment 3 (Compartmentation) to DCID 1/11, "Security Committee." Its mission is, through the SECOM, to:

a. Develop and recommend to the DCI, with the advice of the NFIB, guidance for the establishment, maintenance, and improvement of coordinated compartmentation systems.

b. Formulate, coordinate, maintain, and promulgate administrative guidance and controls concerning access approval criteria and employment in hazardous duty areas; physical security; document identification, handling, accountability and destruction; and ADP and associated materials.

c. Furnish technical guidance and assistance to COMIREX and SIGINT Committees, and to Directors of designated national sensitive collection programs, in connection with their downgrading, declassification, sanitization, and decontrol responsibilities.

d. Review and survey the security standards, practices and procedures employed by Intelligence Community organizations and their contractors regarding approved compartmentation policies, procedures and controls; and make recommendations for practical improvements.

e. Provide advice and guidance to foreign governments participating in US compartmentated intelligence activities.

f. Recommend security policies governing release or disclosure of compartmented intelligence to the public, foreign governments, or international organizations in which the US government participates.

Classified By: Chairman, Compartmentation  
Subcommittee

Review ON: 9 March 1999

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2. ☐ Membership. Current representation on the Compartmentation Subcommittee is as follows:

Chairman:

US Air Force:

CIA:

DIA:

US Army:

US Navy:

NSA:

State Dept:

SAF/SS:

DOE:

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3. ☐ Extent of Community Participation: All members wholeheartedly supported the mission of the Subcommittee and were responsive in fulfilling their individual tasks.

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4. ☐ Principal Activities and Major Accomplishments: During 1978, the Compartmentation Subcommittee was actively involved in the following actions:

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a. During May 1978, the Subcommittee was tasked to review and update the listing of all individuals associated with the Legislative Branch of the Government (less members of Congress), approved at that time, for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). Subcommittee members reviewed the list against their Departmental/Agency access

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records to assure the currency of the master list. The updated master listing was presented to the Office of Legislative Counsel for use as a current data base and copies were made available to departments and agencies represented on the SECOM.

b. On 6 June 1978, the NFIB approved DCID 1/20, "Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel with Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information," culminating an effort begun by the Compartmentation Subcommittee in 1975.

(1) The lengthy deliberation on this matter was caused by the necessity to thoroughly review the ramifications of modifying the longstanding rules which required a "waiver" for all travel to hazardous areas. The new standards developed by the Subcommittee consider the depth of access of each traveler and whether the travel is for official or unofficial purposes. The DCID is applicable to the assignment and travel of all US Government civilian and military personnel, government consultants and employees of government contractors, who have, or have had access to SCI.

(2) Prior to the effective date of the DCID, the Subcommittee was tasked by the Chairman, SECOM, to review the list of countries and areas where assignment and travel restrictions apply. The list was found to be current and valid, and it was incorporated as an Appendix to DCID 1/20. The list was again reviewed during October 1978 and is scheduled to be reviewed by the Subcommittee semiannually or whenever warranted by new information.

c. On 6 June 1978, the NFIB also approved DCID 1/19, "Uniform Procedures for Administrative Handling and Accountability of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)." This DCID was drafted by the Compartmentation Subcommittee pursuant to a 1976 report issued by the SECOM Task Force on Compartmentation, which recommended the establishment of standard administrative policies for all SCI documentation and materials. The DCID consolidated and streamlined the best administrative handling and accountability rules of the three existing SCI control systems without creating a new system of compartmentation or intruding on the authority of Executive Agent or other operational program directors.

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d. On 6 September 1978, the Chairman, SECOM, tasked the Subcommittee to determine what guidance would be needed relative to changes imposed by Executive Order (EO) 12065 and the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) Directive No. 1 on community treatment of SCI and other foreign intelligence. The Subcommittee developed the basis for the DCI memorandum to the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB-9.1/36), 21 December 1978, in which Intelligence Community agency heads and program managers/executive agents were enjoined to ensure that security policies and procedures under their cognizance are in accordance with the EO and ISOO Directive No. 1.

(1) The memorandum specified that the EO and ISOO Directive take precedence over conflicting policies and procedures in existing Intelligence Community directives and regulations to include DCID 1/7, DCID 1/19, and SCI control directives, which the DCI directed would be revised accordingly.

(2) The memorandum further directed that particular attention should be paid to promulgating classification guides, modifying or providing interim changes to existing guides; that all SCI shall be annotated for declassification review on a date 20 years from the date of the material (30 years in the case of Foreign Government Information); and established a standard annotation concerning the reason for extension of classification for a period longer than 6 years in the case of SCI or other intelligence information.

e. Pursuant to the requirement in EO 12065 and DCI instructions to review existing Intelligence Community guidance, the Subcommittee began a proposed revision of DCID 1/7, "Control of Dissemination of Intelligence Information," 18 May 1976.

(1) The revision amplifies applicable portions of EO 12065 and its implementing directive; conforms to changed community organization, responsibilities and terminology as set forth in EO 12036; provides tests for the circumstances under which the security control markings authorized by the directive may be used; eliminates control markings which do not now appear to be needed; reemphasizes basic security requirements that the release of intelligence information to

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foreign governments/nationals and international organizations requires permission of the originator; and simplifies the language of the present DCID in the interest of brevity and understanding.

(2) Subcommittee action on this proposed revision is continuing at present.

5. ☐ Highlights of Work in Progress. The Compartmentation Subcommittee is presently involved in the following projects:

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a. Semiannual review of the Appendix ("Countries and Areas in Which Visits, Travel, and Assignment Are Considered To Be A Hazardous Activity") to DCID 1/20. Each subcommittee member is presently submitting the list of countries and areas to his/her agency's counterintelligence element for review. The Appendix will be recertified as current or revised, as appropriate, based on these reviews.

b. Review of the draft revision of DCID 1/7, "Control and Dissemination of Intelligence Information," continues (see paragraph 4e, above).

c. On 15 November 1978, the Chairman, SECOM, tasked the Compartmentation Subcommittee to serve as the Executive Agent for conducting a "zero-based" clearance review of the NFIB agencies and departments. The review would require each NFIB agency and department to conduct an internal examination of all individual and/or billet positions currently authorized SCI access. On 8 January 1979, the tasking was revised to include only selected operational compartments held within the Intelligence Community. Subcommittee members were furnished the revised tasking and requested to submit their reports to the Subcommittee Chairman by 10 April 1979 in order that a final report might be forwarded to the SECOM by 1 May 1979.

6. ☐ General Work Plan for Calendar Year 1979 and Identification of Significant Issues:

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a. Finalize "zero-based" clearance review and report to the Chairman, SECOM, by 1 May 1979 (see paragraph 5c, above).

b. Continue action in progress on proposed revision of DCID 1/7 (see paragraph 5a, above).

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c. Conduct semiannual review of the Appendix to DCID 1/20 (see paragraph 5a, above).

d. Participate in development of the APEX Security Control System. (Compartmentation Subcommittee members are actively engaged in a number of APEX panels.)

e. Assist, as required, in implementing applicable provisions of APEX Security Control System directive(s).

f. Perform other duties as tasked by the Chairman, SECOM.

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